<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Domain-Hijacking on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/domain-hijacking/</link><description>Recent content in Domain-Hijacking on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 15:49:12 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/domain-hijacking/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Placeholder domain third-party[.]com now serves ClickFix malware via 1,700+ repos</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-25-placeholder-third-party-com-referenced-across-1-700-reposito/</link><pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 15:49:12 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-25-placeholder-third-party-com-referenced-across-1-700-reposito/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> Search all repos, internal docs, and README files for references to &amp;rsquo;third-party[.]com&amp;rsquo; and replace them; any user clicking the link from documentation now risks a ClickFix social-engineering payload targeting Windows.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Block third-party[.]com at DNS/proxy immediately, sweep web proxy and DNS logs for recent queries to that domain, and hunt for ClickFix execution indicators (mshta/PowerShell spawned from browser or Run dialog) since the domain became malicious.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> This demonstrates a new documentation-placeholder squatting attack class affecting thousands of open-source projects; task engineering to audit internal repos this quarter and add placeholder-domain checks to developer guidelines and repository scanning policy.&lt;/li>
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