<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Dns-Tunneling on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/dns-tunneling/</link><description>Recent content in Dns-Tunneling on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 11:37:25 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/dns-tunneling/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Cavern C2 Abuses DNS and Google Apps Script for Covert Iranian Ops</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-18-cavern-c2-uses-dns-and-google-apps-script-to-blend-into-legi/</link><pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 11:37:25 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-18-cavern-c2-uses-dns-and-google-apps-script-to-blend-into-legi/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> The technique of tunneling C2 traffic through DNS and Google Apps Script highlights the risk of assuming cloud-provider traffic is benign; worth reviewing egress controls and whether Google Apps Script domains are in a blanket allow-list on your proxy.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> Build or tune detections for anomalous DNS query volumes and unexpected Google Apps Script callouts from non-developer endpoints; the covert channel technique is novel enough to warrant adding hunt logic this quarter, though no specific IOCs are surfaced in this report.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Iranian nation-state actor using legitimate cloud services to mask C2 is relevant threat-landscape context, particularly for organizations with Israeli business ties, but no immediate leadership action is required.&lt;/li>
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