CuraSec

tag: Dll-Sideloading · 3 items

2026-10-21 · The Hacker News · source ↗ #dll-sideloading#apt#backdoor
  • Engineer — Learn: DLL sideloading via trusted applications like Sandboxie is a technique worth understanding when assessing endpoint hardening and application allow-listing; no patch or config change is actionable here without specific affected software in your stack.
  • SOC/IR — Learn: The Sandboxie sideloading pattern is a useful addition to analyst knowledge of living-off-the-land variations, but without published IOCs or specific process/file artifacts in this summary, no hunt or detection can be written from this alone.
  • Leader — Skip
2026-10-20 · The Hacker News · source ↗ #dll-sideloading#clickfix#siemens
  • Engineer — Plan: Siemens Software Center is niche industrial software, but the DLL sideloading vector with a public PoC and active exploitation warrants a check: audit whether Siemens Software Center is present in your estate and patch to the fixed version; the ClickFix delivery chain also means reviewing write-access to directories alongside software installs.
  • SOC/IR — Act: An active ClickFix campaign is deploying RATs via DLL sideloading in Siemens Software Center directories — hunt for ClickFix lure artifacts (clipboard-hijack/fake CAPTCHA precursors), anomalous DLL loads from Siemens app paths, and RAT beaconing behavior since the campaign was disclosed.
  • Leader — Learn: Active RAT deployment via social engineering against industrial software management tooling is worth noting for OT/manufacturing-sector risk registers, but this is not a systemic event requiring immediate leadership action unless Siemens software is confirmed in your environment.
  • Signals: CVE-2026-110936 — CISA KEV: not listed, EPSS 0.00, public PoC on GitHub
2026-08-26 · The Hacker News · source ↗ #windows-malware#dll-sideloading#backdoor
  • Engineer — Learn: Novel DLL side-loading backdoor with a magic-packet trigger and custom bytecode interpreter — no KEV, PoC, or active exploitation reported. Worth understanding the side-loading pattern to evaluate unsigned DLL monitoring and application allowlisting posture, but no immediate patch or config change is required.
  • SOC/IR — Learn: The dormant-until-triggered approach and custom bytecode execution are evasion techniques worth noting for future DLL side-loading hunt logic, but no IOCs, campaign attribution, or active exploitation are documented in this single-researcher report — nothing actionable to hunt or tune against today.
  • Leader — Skip