<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Defi on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/defi/</link><description>Recent content in Defi on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 13:03:16 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/defi/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>DeFi Audit Scope Gap: 67.6% of H1 2026 Attack Paths Outside Audit Coverage</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-17-the-ack3-h1-2026-defi-incident-dataset-audit-scope-across-13/</link><pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 13:03:16 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-17-the-ack3-h1-2026-defi-incident-dataset-audit-scope-across-13/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Research across 135 DeFi incidents shows that the &amp;lsquo;audited&amp;rsquo; label routinely overstates project-wide assurance — 67.6% of attack paths fell outside all identified pre-incident audit scopes. Useful context when evaluating what your own audit attestations actually cover in board or customer conversations.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Hackers steal $23.7M from Ostium via off-chain infrastructure compromise</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-21-hackers-steal-23-7-million-in-crypto-from-ostium-in-off-chai/</link><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:43:35 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-21-hackers-steal-23-7-million-in-crypto-from-ostium-in-off-chai/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> The attack exploited off-chain price-feed infrastructure to manipulate a DeFi protocol — a useful design-level lesson for anyone building systems that trust external data pipelines (oracles, webhooks, enrichment feeds) without integrity controls. No patch available; review data-ingestion trust boundaries.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>