<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Data-Access on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/data-access/</link><description>Recent content in Data-Access on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 15:46:58 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/data-access/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Google Gemini AI agent to gain broad macOS file/app/web access</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-04-google-gemini-could-soon-get-full-access-to-your-mac-s-files/</link><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 15:46:58 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-04-google-gemini-could-soon-get-full-access-to-your-mac-s-files/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Evaluate data-access scope before allowing Gemini agent features on corporate Macs; audit what organizational data could be exposed and assess whether MDM/endpoint policies need updating to restrict or approve this capability.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Broad AI agent permissions on endpoints introduce new lateral-movement and data-exfiltration surfaces worth tracking as the feature ships; no actionable detection signals available yet.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> Develop or update an AI tool policy covering sanctioned use of AI agents with broad device permissions before employees enable this on corporate hardware; frame acceptable-use boundaries before the feature reaches general availability.&lt;/li>
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