<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Crypto-Miner on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/crypto-miner/</link><description>Recent content in Crypto-Miner on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 17:24:45 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/crypto-miner/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Fake ChatGPT/Claude GitHub Apps Drop Crypto Miners via Signed Loaders</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-29-fake-chatgpt-and-claude-apps-abuse-signed-executables-to-dep/</link><pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 17:24:45 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-29-fake-chatgpt-and-claude-apps-abuse-signed-executables-to-dep/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Developers are a likely target audience for fake AI desktop tools distributed via GitHub. Audit endpoints for unauthorized process execution tied to AI app installs and enforce a policy requiring official sources (openai.com, anthropic.com) for any AI desktop clients used internally.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The Yoba campaign uses signed loaders to slip past initial defenses before dropping miners — worth building detections for unexpected signed-binary child processes spawning mining activity. No specific IOCs are provided in this summary, so a targeted sweep isn&amp;rsquo;t actionable yet; queue a detection rule for anomalous CPU-spike processes spawned by newly installed apps.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> This campaign exploits employee enthusiasm for AI tools to sneak malware in via unofficial downloads — a useful data point for refreshing acceptable-use policy around AI desktop applications and reinforcing approved software procurement channels.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>