<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Context-Exfiltration on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/context-exfiltration/</link><description>Recent content in Context-Exfiltration on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 19:07:02 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/context-exfiltration/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>ContextLeak: Malicious Tools Exfiltrate LLM Agent Runtime Context</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-31-contextleak-exfiltrating-llm-agent-context-via-malicious-too/</link><pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 19:07:02 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-31-contextleak-exfiltrating-llm-agent-context-via-malicious-too/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Novel research demonstrating that RL-crafted tool names and descriptions can coerce an LLM agent into leaking its full runtime context (prompt, trajectory, tool list) to an attacker endpoint; no PoC tooling or active exploitation reported, but teams building or integrating third-party tools into agent pipelines should treat tool metadata as an untrusted attack surface and audit how agents decide to pass context as arguments.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Purely academic research with no IOCs, ATT&amp;amp;CK mappings, or evidence of in-the-wild use; worth tracking as LLM agent deployments grow, but there is no detection or hunting action to take today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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