<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Cobalt-Strike on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/cobalt-strike/</link><description>Recent content in Cobalt-Strike on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 20:16:55 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/cobalt-strike/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>CyberXero Uses Claude Code AI in Campaign Stealing Ukrainian Records</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-12-cyberxero-uses-claude-code-in-campaign-that-stole-over-628-0/</link><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 20:16:55 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-12-cyberxero-uses-claude-code-in-campaign-that-stole-over-628-0/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No specific CVE or patch surface identified — the novelty is AI orchestration layered onto commodity tooling (Cobalt Strike) for initial access against WordPress and e-commerce targets. Worth understanding the attack pattern when assessing AI tool exposure in CI/CD or build environments.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Campaign uses Cobalt Strike (established detection signatures exist) with an AI orchestration layer, but no IOCs or ATT&amp;amp;CK mappings are provided in the disclosure and targeting is Ukraine-specific. File for context on AI-assisted attack tradecraft; revisit if IOCs surface.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Demonstrates AI coding tools being weaponized at campaign scale — relevant context for AI use policy discussions and board-level AI risk framing, but the incident is geographically scoped to Ukraine with no named vendor exposure for US enterprises.&lt;/li>
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