<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Cloud-Identity on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/cloud-identity/</link><description>Recent content in Cloud-Identity on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 14:54:43 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/cloud-identity/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Passkey Phishing Campaigns Target Microsoft Cloud Accounts at Scale</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-13-attackers-use-passkey-phishing-to-hijack-microsoft-cloud-acc/</link><pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 14:54:43 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-13-attackers-use-passkey-phishing-to-hijack-microsoft-cloud-acc/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Demonstrates that passkey-themed social engineering can bypass MFA assumptions — worth factoring into how passkey enrollment flows and conditional access policies are hardened, but no CVE or patch action follows from this disclosure.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The active campaign pattern — CEO-impersonation lures leading to passkey/cloud credential harvesting — is worth building detections around: hunt for anomalous passkey registration events in Entra ID and tune email-gateway rules for third-party-relayed CEO impersonation at volume.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Useful context that passkey adoption does not eliminate cloud account takeover risk; informs future board or customer messaging about layered identity controls, but no vendor breach or regulatory trigger here.&lt;/li>
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