<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Cli-Compromise on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/cli-compromise/</link><description>Recent content in Cli-Compromise on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 15:39:31 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/cli-compromise/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>OVHcloud CLI Releases Backdoored on GitHub for 94 Minutes</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-20-hackers-hijack-five-ovhcloud-cli-releases-to-distribute-secr/</link><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 15:39:31 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-20-hackers-hijack-five-ovhcloud-cli-releases-to-distribute-secr/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> If any developer or CI pipeline downloaded the OVHcloud CLI between 12:47–14:21 UTC on October 19, treat that machine as compromised: rotate all secrets stored on disk (API keys, cloud credentials, SSH keys) and audit for any use of those credentials after that window.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Hunt across all endpoints for execution of the OVHcloud CLI tool during the 94-minute compromise window; follow up with anomaly detection on credential file access patterns and downstream use of any credentials present on affected machines.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Act:&lt;/strong> If your organization uses OVHcloud, immediately determine whether any engineers or pipelines pulled the CLI tool during the affected window; if exposure is confirmed, treat it as a potential credential-theft incident and invoke your IR process before stolen keys are used.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>