Ci-Cd on CuraSec

Unit 42: Attackers Targeting CI/CD Pipelines and Developer Tools

Sat, 22 Aug 2026 11:32:44 +0000

Engineer — Learn: Reinforces the case for auditing CI/CD pipeline permissions, pinning action versions, and reviewing third-party developer tool integrations — no specific CVE or active exploit to act on now.
SOC/IR — Learn: Useful framing for expanding hunt coverage into build pipeline logs and developer tooling telemetry, but no IOCs or specific TTPs are surfaced in this piece.
Leader — Skip

Tue, 18 Aug 2026 11:37:25 +0000

Engineer — Plan: This is a textbook workflow injection pattern — untrusted input from issue metadata flowing into shell steps. Audit your own repos under .github/workflows/ for any workflow triggered by issue/PR events that interpolates github.event.issue.title or body into run: commands, and replace with intermediate env vars or safe contexts.
SOC/IR — Learn: No IOCs or active exploitation are reported, so there is nothing to hunt or detect today; however, understanding that crafted GitHub issues can trigger arbitrary commands in CI pipelines is useful context for evaluating future CI/CD-targeted campaigns.
Leader — Skip

Fri, 07 Aug 2026 11:54:55 +0000

Engineer — Act: If your team runs Claude Code or Gemini CLI in CI pipelines under vendor-default configuration, an unprivileged GitHub issue can reach your runner and exfiltrate CI secrets — audit all AI agent CI integrations now, restrict what secrets are scoped to those runners, and disable issue-triggered agent workflows until hardened configurations are documented.
SOC/IR — Plan: This Black Hat presentation defines a new TTP category — prompt injection via issue trackers targeting AI coding-agent CI workflows — worth building detections for; plan to monitor for anomalous CI runner invocations originating from issue events and unexpected secret-access patterns in pipeline logs.
Leader — Plan: Default configurations of AI coding agents from major vendors expose CI secrets to anyone who can open a GitHub issue — assess whether engineering teams have deployed these tools in CI/CD pipelines this quarter and establish an approval policy for AI agent access to production secrets before adoption widens.

Fri, 07 Aug 2026 00:21:58 +0000

Engineer — Act: A self-propagating npm worm targeting GitHub Actions runner secrets is a direct threat to any CI/CD pipeline using npm packages; audit your runner logs for unexpected outbound calls to Ethereum RPC endpoints and review recently installed or updated npm dependencies for malicious scripts.
SOC/IR — Plan: The blockchain-based C2 technique (Ethereum smart contracts for routing) is a novel evasion method worth building detections for; develop hunt queries for unusual npm postinstall script execution and outbound connections to Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoints from CI runners.
Leader — Learn: This campaign illustrates how supply chain attacks are adopting decentralized infrastructure to evade takedowns — relevant context for board-level discussions on software supply chain risk and CI/CD security investment.

Tue, 28 Jul 2026 13:01:43 +0000

Engineer — Act: A public PoC on GitHub combined with a CVSS 9.8 unauthenticated RCE makes exploitation imminent — patch all on-premises TeamCity instances to 2025.11.7 or 2026.1.3 immediately; Cloud instances are already remediated.
SOC/IR — Act: With a public PoC now available, begin hunting for unauthenticated requests to TeamCity build/run endpoints and review build agent logs for unexpected OS command execution patterns since the PoC publication date.
Leader — Plan: Confirm whether your organization runs TeamCity On-Premises and verify the engineering team has prioritized emergency patching this week — a compromise of CI/CD pipelines carries supply-chain risk that could generate customer or board questions if exploitation is later confirmed.
Signals: CVE-2026-63077 — CISA KEV: not listed, EPSS n/a, public PoC on GitHub

Thu, 23 Jul 2026 12:47:45 +0000

Engineer — Act: Active supply-chain compromise of 10 Packagist packages tied to developer dinushchathurya (July 12–13); audit your PHP dependency tree for these packages, remove or pin away from any dev/pre-release versions, and inspect CI/CD build logs for unexpected executions since July 12.
SOC/IR — Plan: No IOCs are surfaced in the summary, but the campaign’s use of malicious Packagist dev-version installs inside GitHub Actions runners is a detectable pattern — build a detection for unusual package-manager installs of dev/pre-release versions in pipeline logs and hunt for dinushchathurya package executions since July 12.
Leader — Learn: This campaign illustrates how a single compromised developer account can turn a public package registry into attack infrastructure; useful context when reviewing third-party dependency risk in your software supply chain policy.

Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:18:39 +0000

Engineer — Act: Confirmed supply chain compromise of AsyncAPI npm packages with import-time malware execution — audit all projects for AsyncAPI dependencies, check CI/CD build logs for the affected package versions, and rotate any secrets accessible from compromised build environments.
SOC/IR — Act: Active campaign with malware delivered at import time via npm means CI/CD runner telemetry is the primary hunt surface — sweep build system logs for suspicious outbound connections or process spawns during npm install/import phases since the compromise window, and tune EDR rules to flag unusual child processes from package managers.
Leader — Act: A weaponized CI/CD supply chain attack of this type can expose credentials and intellectual property across every project that consumed the affected packages — confirm internally whether AsyncAPI packages are in use, request an exposure assessment from engineering, and prepare to brief leadership given the potential scope.

Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:18:39 +0000

Engineer — Learn: The updated analysis covers wormable malware patterns, CI/CD persistence techniques, and multi-stage npm attack chains — useful for hardening your pipeline and package vetting posture, but no specific package compromise or KEV signal requiring immediate action today.
SOC/IR — Learn: The breakdown of npm attack TTPs (worm propagation, CI/CD persistence) helps tune detection logic for build pipeline anomalies, but no concrete IOCs or active campaign indicators are surfaced in this item.
Leader — Skip