<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Certificate-Misissuance on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/certificate-misissuance/</link><description>Recent content in Certificate-Misissuance on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 17:51:36 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/certificate-misissuance/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Hackers hijack Google domains after breaching ccTLD registries</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-08-hackers-hijack-google-domains-after-breaching-cctld-registri/</link><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 17:51:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-08-hackers-hijack-google-domains-after-breaching-cctld-registri/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Registry-level DNS tampering enabled unauthorized certificate issuance — audit DNS records and check Certificate Transparency logs (crt.sh) for any unexpected cert issuances on domains your org owns, especially in .gh/.as/.sl ccTLDs; confirm DNSSEC is enabled where possible.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Act:&lt;/strong> Active DNS hijacking via compromised registry operators is in progress — query CT logs for unexpected certificate issuances against your org&amp;rsquo;s domains, and hunt for anomalous DNS record changes since early October 2026 across your monitored domain portfolio.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> Breach of ccTLD registry operators affecting multiple country-code TLDs warrants an inventory check — confirm whether your organization holds domains in .gh, .as, or .sl ccTLDs and request a DNS record integrity attestation from your registrar or domain management vendor.&lt;/li>
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