<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Cctld on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/cctld/</link><description>Recent content in Cctld on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 17:51:36 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/cctld/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Attackers Hijack Three ccTLD Registries to Forge Google HTTPS Certs</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-08-attackers-hijack-gh-sl-and-as-registries-to-obtain-certifica/</link><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 17:51:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-08-attackers-hijack-gh-sl-and-as-registries-to-obtain-certifica/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Audit Certificate Transparency logs (crt.sh) for unauthorized certificates issued against any domains your organization owns in .gh, .sl, or .as TLDs; if hits found, treat as active compromise and revoke/reissue. Broader takeaway: review certificate pinning posture for critical services.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Registry-level compromise enabling HTTPS certificate fraud is a novel MITM vector worth understanding, but the summary provides no IOCs, TTPs, or detection signatures to act on today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> Determine whether your organization operates services or depends on vendors using .gh, .sl, or .as domains; if so, commission a CT log audit this quarter and confirm no traffic was intercepted. No immediate board action needed unless exposure is confirmed.&lt;/li>
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