<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Camera on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/camera/</link><description>Recent content in Camera on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 11:39:11 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/camera/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>14,500 Dahua IP cameras compromised in 35-day CameraSwarm campaign</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-20-hackers-compromise-14-500-dahua-web-cameras-in-35-day-campai/</link><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 11:39:11 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-20-hackers-compromise-14-500-dahua-web-cameras-in-35-day-campai/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> If Dahua cameras are in scope, audit all units for default or weak credentials and remove any direct internet exposure; the campaign scale suggests opportunistic credential stuffing across this device class, but no KEV or PoC shifts this below Act.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No IOCs or ATT&amp;amp;CK-mappable TTPs are surfaced in this item, and the compromise is geographically concentrated in Ukraine and Russia — limited detection work is actionable for a typical enterprise SOC without more detail.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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