<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Camera-Hijacking on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/camera-hijacking/</link><description>Recent content in Camera-Hijacking on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 16:34:51 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/camera-hijacking/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Dahua IP Cameras Hijacked via P2P Access and Auth Weaknesses</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-27-attackers-hijack-dahua-ip-cameras-in-ukraine-using-p2p-acces/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 16:34:51 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-27-attackers-hijack-dahua-ip-cameras-in-ukraine-using-p2p-acces/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Dahua cameras are widely deployed beyond Ukraine; disable P2P cloud-access features, audit devices for unauthorized accounts, and verify authentication is hardened against default or weak credentials — no KEV/PoC signals but CERT-UA confirms active exploitation.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> CERT-UA confirms active compromise of Dahua devices but the summary provides no IOCs, TTPs, or specific actor attribution to build detections from; monitor for a follow-on advisory with indicators before investing hunt time.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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