<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Business-Email-Compromise on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/business-email-compromise/</link><description>Recent content in Business-Email-Compromise on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 11:41:42 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/business-email-compromise/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Gen H1 2026: BEC banking-malware and clipboard crypto-hijacking chains</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-09-real-emails-hijacked-payments-two-h1-2026-attack-chains/</link><pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 11:41:42 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-09-real-emails-hijacked-payments-two-h1-2026-attack-chains/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> The browser-manipulation and clipboard-hijacking techniques described are useful inputs for reviewing endpoint browser policies and clipboard-access controls, but no specific CVE, patch, or misconfiguration is identified — no change to running systems required today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> The two attack chains — compromised inboxes paired with browser manipulation for banking malware, and clipboard redirection for crypto theft — offer concrete TTP patterns worth formalizing into detections; with no IOCs provided, this is a this-quarter detection-engineering task rather than an immediate hunt.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> H1 2026 threat-report data on BEC-linked banking malware and clipboard-hijacking fraud is useful context for risk briefings or board decks, but no corroborating signals elevate this to an action item.&lt;/li>
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