<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Btcpay-Server on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/btcpay-server/</link><description>Recent content in Btcpay-Server on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 18:24:39 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/btcpay-server/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Active Exploitation of BTCPay Server Flaw Drains Hot Wallets</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-11-03-hackers-exploit-btcpay-server-flaw-to-steal-bitcoin-and-lite/</link><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 18:24:39 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-11-03-hackers-exploit-btcpay-server-flaw-to-steal-bitcoin-and-lite/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Act:&lt;/strong> Active exploitation confirmed with real financial losses; update BTCPay Server to the latest version (anything beyond 2.4.1, released July 23, 2026) immediately on any self-hosted instances, and audit hot wallet balances for unauthorized withdrawals.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> Exploitation is confirmed but this summary provides no IOCs, TTPs, or log artifacts to hunt on; inventory any BTCPay Server deployments in the estate, check running versions against the vulnerable ≤2.4.1 threshold, and flag for the engineer team — revisit if technical indicators surface.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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