<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Authorization on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/authorization/</link><description>Recent content in Authorization on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:31:24 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/authorization/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Neural Cryptographic Services: Cryptographic Auth for AI Agent Workflows</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-20-from-neural-intent-to-cryptographic-authorization-governing/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:31:24 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-20-from-neural-intent-to-cryptographic-authorization-governing/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Research proposes interposing a deterministic symbolic controller with signed hash-chained instruction streams between LLM agents and privileged tools to prevent prompt-injection-driven authorization bypass — worth reviewing when architecting AI agent pipelines with privileged tool access, but no production implementation exists to adopt yet.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Highlights a structural gap in current AI agent deployments: identity-based auth doesn&amp;rsquo;t constrain which actions an authenticated agent can take at runtime, creating hijack risk relevant to any enterprise adopting agentic workflows; useful framing for AI governance policy discussions.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Zero-auth multi-tenant flaw found in DoD-backed SaaS platform</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-16-securing-a-dod-contractor-finding-a-multi-tenant-authorizati/</link><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:18:39 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-16-securing-a-dod-contractor-finding-a-multi-tenant-authorizati/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> A real-world case study on broken object-level authorization in a multi-tenant SaaS context — review your own tenant-isolation logic and authorization checks at API boundaries for similar patterns.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Illustrates how authorization failures in multi-tenant SaaS can expose all customers&amp;rsquo; data, useful context for vendor risk assessments and security questionnaire review criteria.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Proof-of-Continuity: Causal Authority Model for Distributed Systems and AI Agents</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-13-proof-of-continuity-a-temporal-model-for-authority-propagati/</link><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 14:30:14 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-13-proof-of-continuity-a-temporal-model-for-authority-propagati/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> This paper formalizes a causal authority-propagation model that prevents confused deputy attacks across service hops and AI agent tool-call chains — worth reviewing if designing multi-service or agentic authorization architectures, but requires no immediate change to running systems.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Introduces a theoretical framework for constraining authority in AI agent pipelines, relevant background for leaders developing governance policies around agentic AI deployments, but no near-term board or regulatory action is indicated.&lt;/li>
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