<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Attack-Techniques on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/attack-techniques/</link><description>Recent content in Attack-Techniques on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 17:01:08 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/attack-techniques/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>New Prompt Injection Techniques Target AI Agent Planning</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-30-new-prompt-injection-techniques-cover-agent-planning-attacks/</link><pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 17:01:08 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-30-new-prompt-injection-techniques-cover-agent-planning-attacks/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> New research on prompt injection attacks targeting agent-planning workflows is worth reviewing for teams building or deploying LLM-based agents, but no enrichment signals indicate active exploitation requiring immediate action.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Documents a new TTP class against AI agent pipelines; no IOCs or detection surface are evident from the title alone, so file for context when developing future coverage of AI-agent abuse.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> If AI agents are being adopted in your environment, add agent-planning prompt injection to your AI usage policy and risk register this quarter — this research signals the attack surface is maturing before most enterprises have governance in place.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Unit 42 Surveys Modern OAuth Attack Landscape</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-23-the-current-landscape-of-oauth-attacks/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:44:28 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-23-the-current-landscape-of-oauth-attacks/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> OAuth flows and OIDC configurations are core to cloud/app infrastructure; a landscape piece from Unit 42 can sharpen threat modeling for token handling and consent flows, but no enrichment signals indicate immediate exploitation pressure requiring a config or patch change.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Understanding current OAuth abuse TTPs (token theft, consent phishing, app impersonation) can improve detection coverage in M365 and cloud environments, but the summary provides no specific IOCs or ATT&amp;amp;CK mappings to act on today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Browser-Based Attack Techniques Overview 2026</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-30-know-your-enemy-browser-based-attack-techniques-in-2026/</link><pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:48:49 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-30-know-your-enemy-browser-based-attack-techniques-in-2026/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> A survey of browser attack chain patterns is worth reading to inform secure-by-design decisions for web apps and internal tooling, but the truncated summary provides no specific CVE, package, or configuration to act on.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Understanding that full attack chains can play out inside a single browser session is useful framing for tuning browser-telemetry detections, but no IOCs, TTPs, or detection rules are surfaced in the available content.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>