<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Attack-Technique on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/attack-technique/</link><description>Recent content in Attack-Technique on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 15:27:03 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/attack-technique/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Rogue external MFA provider registration can harvest passwords at login</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-23-rogue-external-mfa-providers-can-steal-passwords-during-logi/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 15:27:03 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-23-rogue-external-mfa-providers-can-steal-passwords-during-logi/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> Audit who holds privileges to register external MFA providers in your identity platform (Entra ID, Okta, etc.) and restrict that permission to a minimal group; no active exploitation reported, but the attack surface is real for orgs using federated MFA.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Plan:&lt;/strong> Instrument your identity-platform audit logs to alert on new external MFA provider registrations — this technique leaves a trace there; no IOCs or active campaign to hunt for today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Research demonstrates that a privileged insider or compromised admin account could silently intercept credentials via a rogue MFA provider; informs insider-threat and vendor-risk conversations but requires no immediate action given no reported exploitation.&lt;/li>
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