<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Arm-Soc on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/arm-soc/</link><description>Recent content in Arm-Soc on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 21:14:27 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/arm-soc/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>HOMARD: Power-rail side channel recovers DRAM data on ARM SoCs</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-12-homard-hammering-off-chip-memory-via-aggregate-power-rail-di/</link><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 21:14:27 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-12-homard-hammering-off-chip-memory-via-aggregate-power-rail-di/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> Novel attack class: unprivileged power-telemetry sensors can reverse-engineer DRAM addressing and recover secret bytes without timing, bypassing existing timer-based mitigations. No patch exists; relevant if you run sensitive workloads on ARM SoCs (Jetson, Pi-class boards) where power rail access is attacker-accessible.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
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