<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ai-Research on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ai-research/</link><description>Recent content in Ai-Research on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 21:14:27 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ai-research/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Novel Multi-Stage LLM Backdoor Uses Invisible Tokens to Evade Detection</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-12-cancerous-backdoor-attack-gradual-activation-via-invisible-t/</link><pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 21:14:27 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-12-cancerous-backdoor-attack-gradual-activation-via-invisible-t/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> This research demonstrates that LLM backdoors can corrupt reasoning gradually across interaction stages, making accuracy-based monitoring insufficient — teams deploying fine-tuned or third-party models should evaluate whether their model-validation pipelines can detect staged behavioral drift, not just terminal outputs.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No IOCs or active campaign; the attack requires model-level access to plant, placing it outside typical SIEM/EDR detection scope today, but understanding this gradual-activation pattern is useful context if investigating anomalous LLM output in AI-assisted workflows.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Academic research with no current exploitation signals, but the finding that reasoning corruption can precede visible accuracy drops is worth noting for AI governance discussions — particularly for organizations using externally fine-tuned models or LLM APIs where model provenance is opaque.&lt;/li>
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