<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ai-Ide on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ai-ide/</link><description>Recent content in Ai-Ide on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 21:01:55 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ai-ide/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Amazon Kiro IDE prompt injection enables data exfiltration via Kiro Powers</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-27-amazon-kiro-prompt-injection-can-exfiltrate-sensitive-data-t/</link><pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 21:01:55 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-08-27-amazon-kiro-prompt-injection-can-exfiltrate-sensitive-data-t/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> If your developers run Amazon Kiro IDE 0.7.45 on Windows, verify whether a patched version is available and update; the prompt injection → data exfiltration path via Kiro Powers is a real supply-chain risk for dev environments. No KEV or PoC signals elevate this to Act.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No IOCs, active exploitation evidence, or ATT&amp;amp;CK-mappable detection surface are present; the item illustrates a prompt injection exfiltration pattern in agentic IDEs worth tracking as AI dev tooling becomes a threat surface.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Useful data point for AI tool governance: agentic IDEs can become data-exfiltration vectors via prompt injection, with no CVE or patch timeline disclosed yet — worth a line item when reviewing AI-assisted development tool policies.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>