<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ai-Agent-Security on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ai-agent-security/</link><description>Recent content in Ai-Agent-Security on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:43:46 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ai-agent-security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Claude Cowork Sandbox Escape Lets AI Agent Read/Write Mac Files</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-24-claude-cowork-flaw-could-let-ai-agent-escape-its-vm-and-acce/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 12:43:46 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-07-24-claude-cowork-flaw-could-let-ai-agent-escape-its-vm-and-acce/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Plan:&lt;/strong> A VM sandbox escape in Claude Cowork exposes the host Mac filesystem to the AI agent process; no KEV or public PoC yet, but the impact is high for any developer running this on a work machine. Check your Claude Cowork version and apply any available update; restrict the tool to non-sensitive environments until patched.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No active exploitation or IOCs reported, but this is a useful technique study: AI agent processes breaking out of containerized environments into host filesystems is an emerging attack class worth factoring into future detection logic for AI tooling on endpoints.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Plan:&lt;/strong> With ~500,000 macOS users potentially affected, confirm whether Claude Cowork is in use on corporate machines and verify patch status with the vendor; this also warrants a policy checkpoint on which AI agent tools are approved for use on managed endpoints.&lt;/li>
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