<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Adb-Abuse on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/adb-abuse/</link><description>Recent content in Adb-Abuse on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 14:58:07 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/adb-abuse/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>RatHat Android Malware Uses ADB for Persistence After Uninstall</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-18-rathat-android-malware-abuses-adb-to-retain-shell-access-aft/</link><pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 14:58:07 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-09-18-rathat-android-malware-abuses-adb-to-retain-shell-access-aft/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> The ADB-based persistence mechanism — retaining shell access after the app is removed — is a novel technique worth understanding for Android MDM/BYOD posture reviews, but there are no enrichment signals and no cloud/infra surface to patch today.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No IOCs or ATT&amp;amp;CK-mapped detections are provided, so there is nothing to hunt immediately; the smishing delivery chain and ADB persistence behavior are worth filing for future Android/BYOD detection coverage if your estate includes managed Android endpoints.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item></channel></rss>