<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ad-Fraud on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ad-fraud/</link><description>Recent content in Ad-Fraud on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 20:44:36 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/ad-fraud/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Google Disrupts 1.3M-Device Android TV Box Botnet; Maker Sold Access</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-11-02-google-disrupts-1-3-million-device-android-botnet-says-tv-bo/</link><pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 20:44:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-11-02-google-disrupts-1-3-million-device-android-botnet-says-tv-bo/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Skip&lt;/strong>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> Residential-proxy botnets built from compromised consumer hardware can route malicious traffic through home IPs, complicating geo-based blocking; no IOCs were published and the C2 infrastructure was already disrupted, so there is no immediate hunt to run.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> An OEM intentionally shipping backdoored hardware at scale is a meaningful supply-chain integrity data point for hardware procurement policies, though the affected devices are consumer TV boxes rather than enterprise equipment — no immediate vendor attestation action required.&lt;/li>
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