<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Account-Compromise on CuraSec</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/account-compromise/</link><description>Recent content in Account-Compromise on CuraSec</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:10:43 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/tags/account-compromise/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Nikkei discloses employee Microsoft/Google email account breaches</title><link>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-06-nikkei-discloses-breaches-of-employees-microsoft-google-emai/</link><pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:10:43 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://curasec.metacog.co.kr/insights/2026-10-06-nikkei-discloses-breaches-of-employees-microsoft-google-emai/</guid><description>&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Engineer — Learn:&lt;/strong> No attack vector disclosed and no enrichment signals, so no specific patch or config action is warranted; treat as a real-world reminder to validate MFA enforcement and conditional access policies on M365/Google Workspace accounts in your own environment.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>SOC/IR — Learn:&lt;/strong> No IOCs or ATT&amp;amp;CK-mappable TTPs were published, so there is nothing actionable to hunt or detect right now; the incident reinforces awareness that phishing campaigns can originate from previously-trusted domains after account takeover.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Leader — Learn:&lt;/strong> Nikkei is not a systemic vendor for most enterprises, so this does not trigger exposure-verification or board-level action; it is useful context for future discussions on email account security posture and incident disclosure practices.&lt;/li>
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