Act
archived
Certighost: Low-Privilege AD User Can Impersonate Domain Controller via ADCS
- Engineer — Act: A public working exploit now lets any domain user abuse ADCS to obtain a DC certificate and DCSync the krbtgt hash — full domain compromise from low privilege. Immediately audit certificate templates in ADCS for enrollment rights that allow non-admin principals, and restrict or disable any template that can issue DC computer certificates to ordinary users.
- SOC/IR — Act: Working exploit means this attack path is now within reach of any authenticated user; hunt for ADCS certificate requests from non-computer, non-privileged accounts targeting DC-class templates, and sweep SIEM/EDR for DCSync (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) events originating from unexpected principals since July 24.
- Leader — Plan: No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation yet, but a public PoC dropping a full domain-compromise chain from a low-privilege user is a credible near-term crisis. Ensure your AD/identity team has a remediation task in flight this week, and prepare a brief in case this escalates to customer or board questions the way ADCS misconfigurations have in the past.
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